
“This still from footage from an airborne camera of the ascent of Apollo 6 shows debris coming from the SLA.”
“Apollo 6 lifted off smoothly and cleared the tower after performing a yaw maneuver to provide a bit more clearance for the ascending Saturn V. Fortunately, the modifications made to the pad facilities resulted in much less damage on MLP-2 than MLP-1 had experienced during the Apollo 4 launch five months earlier. At 11.1 seconds after launch, SA-502 began a 20-second roll maneuver to align itself to the proper azimuth so that it could begin to slowly pitch over and start travelling downrange. While all seemed to be going well with the flight, at the 110-second mark the ascending rocket began to experience a longitudinal oscillation known as pogo. Superimposed on the steadily growing acceleration curve was an oscillation with a frequency in the 5.2 to 5.5 hertz range which reached a peak amplitude of ±0.6 g about 125 seconds into the flight – over six times larger than the same effect experienced by Apollo 4. This was much higher than the ±0.25 g upper limit permitted during earlier manned missions and would have been intolerable for any crew. If Apollo 6 had carried astronauts, it would have certainly been aborted at this point.
But as the longitudinal oscillations began to die out and finally reach acceptable levels 140 seconds after launch, ground-based and airborne cameras tracking the ascending Saturn V noted several pieces of debris coming off from the area of the SLA just after 133 seconds of flight. At about this time, the emergency detection system (which was flying in an automated closed-loop configuration for the first time) cast one vote for aborting the mission which would have been mandatory had a second vote been cast. Changes in the telemetry readings indicated that the outer skin of one of the SLA panels had debonded and separated from the rocket. Fortunately, the SLA maintained its overall structural integrity allowing the ascent to continue.
The center engine of the S-IC stage shutdown as expected 144.9 seconds after launch followed by the outer four F-1 engines at 148.4 seconds. After operating for just 1.1 seconds longer than planned and travelling just 7.3 meters per second faster than nominal, the S-IC stage was separated 149 seconds after launch at an altitude of 60.1 kilometers. The S-IC-2 had completed its task and fell to Earth breaking up about 397 seconds after launch at an altitude of 28.9 kilometers some 611 kilometers downrange. Aside from the 30 seconds of excessive vibration and the failure of three of its four camera pods to eject from the falling stage, S-IC-2 had met its objectives.
After casting off its spent first stage, the five J-2 engines of the S-II stage ignited 149.8 seconds after launch as Apollo 6 continued to accelerate towards orbit. At 184.8 seconds after launch, the LES separated since it was no longer needed to support abort options for the rest of the mission. All was going well until the 319-second mark when the fuel flow rate on engine J-2044 in the no. 2 position on the S-II stage suddenly increased at the same time its thrust decreased. Following a spike in the engine bay temperature, engine no. 2 shut down after running for 263.8 seconds out of a planned 368.8-second burn. Although it was showing no signs of trouble, engine J-2508 in the no. 3 position also shutdown 1.3 seconds later. After the loss of two J-2 engines, the Saturn V guidance system did its best to cope with the situation. While never configured to deal with the loss of two J-2 engines, Apollo 6 continued its ascent. Finally, the remaining three engines of S-II-2 shutdown nine minutes and 36.3 seconds after liftoff. With the three remaining engines burning for 58.8 seconds longer than planned, Apollo 6 was travelling 102.3 meters per second slower than expected due to the lower acceleration while being 436.8 kilometer farther downrange and 6.4 kilometers higher because of how the guidance system tried to cope with the unexpected situation.
After separating from the now spent S-II stage, the single J-2 engine of S-IVB-502 ignited just a second after the S-II engines shutdown to continue the troubled ascent to orbit. The guidance system continued to attempt to get Apollo 6 back on course to reach a 185-kilometer parking orbit despite being too high and travelling too slow. Finally at 12 minutes and 27 seconds after launch, the S-IVB shutdown after burning almost 29 seconds longer than planned. Instead of being in a circular 185-kilometer circular orbit, Apollo 6 was in a more eccentric 173.0 by 356.8-kilometer orbit. Despite this off-nominal orbit and the longer than expected burn time, enough propellant remained in the S-IVB to proceed with the mission and perform the TLI burn near the end of the second revolution.”
All above is an extract & minor paraphrasing from Andrew LePage’s eminently readable account & website (DREW exmachina), at:
www.drewexmachina.com/2018/04/04/apollo-6-the-saturn-v-th...
And, specifically, the image:
i0.wp.com/www.drewexmachina.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/0...
Also, per “APOLLO 6 ANOMALY REPORT NO. 6: ABNORMAL STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE DURING LAUNCH PHASE (MSC-PT-R-68-22)”, compiled by NASA’s Apollo 6 Structual Task Team:
“Approximately 2 minutes 13 seconds after lift-off of the Apollo 6 mission, abrupt changes of strain, vibration, and acceleration measurements were indicated in the S-IVB, instrument unit, adapter, lunar module, and command and service modules; photographs showed objects coming from the area of the adapter. The adapter, however, continued to sustain the required loads with no impairment of the mission.
The investigation was first focused upon the understanding of the coupled vibration modes and characteristics of the launch vehicle and spacecraft. Extensive test programs were conducted. It was eventually concluded that the adapter failure was not caused by vibration.
Extensive study of the airborne photography and other evidence indicated that a large area of the adapter had lost inner facesheet from the honeycomb sandwich panels. Loads and stresses resulting from vibration were determined to be insufficient to initiate such a failure.
The investigation was then directed toward determining the range of pressures that could have been trapped in the Apollo 6 adapter sandwich panels, and toward determining the tolerance of the panels to withstand pressure with various degrees of flaws such as adhesive voids and facesheet dents. The degradation effects of moisture and heat exposure on the adhesive strength were also studied and tested. These tests and analyses led to the conclusion that pressure internal to the sandwich panels could have caused the failure, if a large flaw existed. The pressure buildup would have been caused by aerodynamic heating effects on air and moisture trapped in the panel.
The probable cause of the failure was found in the original ultrasonic inspection scan record of the affected adapter panel. In the center of the region where the adapter failed, horizontally along the station 709 panel splice, the record contained two thick anomalous lines extending several feet. Without an X-ray record of this region, the significance of this particular scan record cannot be fully understood. However, since all other evidence had indicated that the adhesive had to be weakened in a rather large area to initiate the failure, the investigation was focused intently upon the station 709 splices of other adapters. Sufficient information was developed to verify that deficient assembly techniques have consistently resulted in abnormalities in the structure at this station. These abnormalities were identified in adapters 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.
Before the splice abnormalities were pinpointed, corrective action was taken to reduce pressure "buildup in the honeycomb panels and to reduce heat degrading effects on the adhesive. This was done by drilling vent holes in the inner facesheet and covering the outer facesheet with cork. The adapters having identified abnormalities in the station 709 splice are being repaired, and the contractor is investigating ways of avoiding these abnormalities in panels yet to be bonded.”
At/From:
ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19740078908/downloads/1974007...
And:
forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=28946.20
Credit: NASA Spaceflight Forum website
Finally:
galacticjourney.org/tag/apollo-6/
Credit: “Galactic Journey” website
Understandably, there are plenty of others.
The photograph is in fantastic condition, despite the numeral 25. Believe me, it’s not coming off, I tried. That, and the three-ring binder holes make me think this photo was actually used in some sort of in-house analysis, presentation, etc.
Lastly, the explanation for the normal - albeit alarming in appearance - phenomena seen during every Saturn V ascent:
gwsbooks.blogspot.com/2015/04/saturn-v-s-ic-flow-separati...
Credit: Wes Oleszewski/"Growing Up With Spaceflight blog